Clash of Monarchies: The Third War of Italian Independence

The last of the three wars to secure the unity and independence of the Kingdom of Italy requires more than the usual background information. The preliminaries took longer than the war itself. The Second War of Italian Independence had seen the Austrian Empire beaten by the French and Italians at the bloody Battle of Solferino in 1859. Austria was forced to cede Lombardy to the King of Piedmont-Sardinia as well as the conquest of Modena, Parma, Tuscany and most of the Papal States in 1860 which were united with the rest of the northern half of the peninsula under the House of Savoy of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. However, the French ultimately won few friends and, by the time the smoke had cleared, came to be seen as duplicitous by both the Austrians and many Italians. Moreover, the Prussians had mobilized during the conflict but had not taken part. They too were pursuing a nationalist goal of reunifying all of the German states into one empire (Reich). Austria, rather than lead, stood opposed to this and the war in Italy was used by the Prussians as proof of both Austrian weakness and a greater concern for maintaining their rule over non-Germans than for resuming leadership of the German nation on the part of Austria.

Franz Joseph, Wilhelm I, Vittorio Emanuele II

All of that was simmering and would ultimately come to a boil when Bismarck was to provoke Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph into a war (just as Napoleon III had done in 1859 and others would do yet again). In the meantime, however, the unification of the Italian peninsula continued apace and in a shocking way. The famed Italian nationalist, Giuseppe Garibaldi, renowned for his exploits in South America and his defeat of the French in front of Rome in 1849, was as eager as ever to go on the attack. In 1849, Garibaldi, a lifelong republican and Freemason, had fought for the radical republicans of Giuseppe Mazzini. However, he had seen them prove totally incapable of governing and witnessed how easily they were defeated. Since then, he had seen King Vittorio Emanuele II and his royalists, deliver actual victories for the nationalist cause and Garibaldi was that rare case of a nationalist who did not put his own ideology before all else. If the republicans, who he favored, could not get the job done, he would fight his battles on behalf of a monarch if that meant the furtherance of the nationalist cause. However, given his background, his politics and his aggressiveness, the government of King Vittorio Emanuele II, led by Count Camillo Cavour, had to be careful in how it dealt with Garibaldi, to make use of him while not being seen too blatantly to make use of him in case his far-fetched scheme might fail.

The scheme he had in mind was nothing short of the conquest of the Kingdom of the Two-Sicilies, ruled, at that time, by the cadet branch of the Spanish Royal Family. In May of 1860, with only a thousand volunteers, Garibaldi sailed out to take on the Bourbon monarchy which possessed a large army and a bigger navy than Piedmont-Sardinia. He and his little force of men, garishly dressed in red shirts, landed in Sicily, the garrison of which had been reinforced from 21,000 to 40,000 men when word of Garibaldi’s plan reached Naples. Garibaldi should have had no chance at all, however, he was a master at misdirection and the Kingdom of the Two-Sicilies proved far less formidable in fact than it appeared on paper. Particularly in Sicily, the repeated rebellions of the previous decades had taken their toll and the King, Francesco II, had wiped out his Swiss mercenaries, his best troops, when they went on strike over better pay and conditions.

Battle of Calatafimi

Garibaldi could never have conquered Sicily with only a thousand men but many Sicilian peasants rushed to join his cause and more reinforcements would be arriving by ship later on. The first decisive action was the Battle of Calatafimi on May 15, 1860. If the Neapolitans had beaten Garibaldi there, he would have been ruined and his local support would have melted away. Yet, though outnumbered 3-to-1, Garibaldi managed to win, or at least not lose which was good enough for his purposes. Emboldened by this, and attracting a little over a thousand more local volunteers in the aftermath, Garibaldi launched a direct assault on the coastal fortress city of Palermo. He let prisoners out of jail which enlarged his forces and had little trouble rousing the city to rebellion (Palermo had a history of this) but the Neapolitan general, the elderly Ferdinando Lanza, managed to drive them back after which he and his offshore naval support shelled the city for three days, killing hundreds of civilians. This, obviously, did nothing to help the Bourbon cause in the long-run. Many have since accused Lanza of having been paid off by the British but I would be hesitant to believe such a thing without hard evidence. He did surrender the city to a force smaller than his own and which was practically out of ammunition but he did so only after his own counter-attack had failed. The enemy were in the city and it seemed impossible to dislodge them. He also had permission from his King to withdraw and on July 7 the Neapolitan army did just that.

Garibaldi & the King meet at Teano

Earlier that month King Francesco II had granted a(nother) constitution but it did him no good. Those who wanted one no longer believed the Bourbon monarchy trustworthy on this subject while the more reactionary supporters of the monarchy were put off by it. After Garibaldi’s forces won another victory at Milazzo, the Neapolitan commander surrendered the key fortress city of Messina less than a week later. The remaining Neapolitan garrisons on the island surrendered soon after. Garibaldi was master of Sicily and controlled access to the mainland. The next month he and his forces crossed over to Calabria, against the direct wishes of Cavour who had conspired with Garibaldi to make the invasion of Sicily possible. In Calabria there was little effective resistance as the large Bourbon armies simply melted away, many simply deserting and not a few even crossing over to join Garibaldi. In the meantime, the Piedmontese had invaded the remaining Papal States on the pretext of suppressing disorder. Pope Pius IX deployed his own army but held them back, certain that France or Austria would come to his aid. Neither did. Further south, the gallant, young, King Francesco II barricaded himself inside the coastal fortress of Gaeta with his few remaining loyal troops. The Piedmontese army and the army of Garibaldi linked up with Garibaldi handing all of his conquests over to King Vittorio Emanuele II of Italy. The siege of Gaeta dragged on to its inevitable conclusion, showing at least what an inspiring leader King Francesco II was and what he might have accomplished if he had taken to the field to defend his kingdom personally.

After 100 days of resistance, Francesco II surrendered and went into exile, the south was reunited with the north for the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire and Vittorio Emanuele II was proclaimed King of Italy. Of the major Italian territories, only Rome and Venice remained out of reach. Rome was occupied by the French and Venice by the Austrians. Peaceful efforts to gain these came to nothing. The new King of Italy offered to purchase Venice from Emperor Franz Joseph, but was refused. Likewise, Pope Pius IX refused to hear of the offer of Cavour for absolute sovereign immunity for the pope and total power for him in all Church matters. The status quo, however, could not endure as the nationalist movement which had taken hold in Italy would never abide separation from Venice and Rome. Not long after, Count Cavour suddenly died and though the King had never liked him much, the two had learned how to work together and a period of some political instability ensued. Garibaldi, seeing his work still unfinished, recruited some more volunteers and made to attack Rome. The French and Austrians both threatened war if he was not stopped and so the Italian army did the job, halting the nationalist volunteers at the Battle of Aspromonte in August of 1862, even wounding Garibaldi himself in the process.

King Wilhelm I & Bismarck

This was what we would call today a public relations nightmare for the Italian government and to an extent broke the nationalist-monarchist coalition. The royalists accused the nationalists of being rash and foolhardy while the nationalists accused the King of caring more for the Pope than for Italy, taking the side of the French occupiers over the Italian people. All of this added pressure on the new Kingdom of Italy to take any chance that presented itself to regain its nationalist credentials. The government saw hope for regaining Venice when, also in 1861, Otto von Bismarck became chancellor of the Kingdom of Prussia. Bismarck was well known as a man who was determined to have a united Germany and if Austria would not lead, he would push them out of the way and Prussia would assume leadership. However, when Napoleon III proved not so positive toward Prussia and negative toward Austria as Bismarck had hoped, Prussia and Austria renewed ties under the German Confederation (just in time for a war with Denmark). Italian hopes for an alliance were dashed, but the reunion did not last long.

Conflict began to bubble up over disagreements between Austria and Prussia over the administration of the lands taken in the war with Denmark. Among German nationalists, there had also been a long standing division over whether or not the united Germany would include Austria due to the fact that Austria also ruled over so many non-German peoples that German nationalists cared nothing about. With the Austro-Prussian dispute, that matter was settled; Austria would be excluded and, as far as Bismarck was concerned, could go on having fun in her ‘majority minority’ empire. If Prussia were to take on Austria, there would be no better time as Habsburg foreign policy had managed to alienate just about everyone by this stage. Austria was sore at the French for allowing the incorporation of the central Italian states into the Kingdom of Italy and so, naturally, the French were sore at Austria in return. The Italians, naturally, wanted Venice back and so were certainly not going to take the side of Austria and, most importantly, the Russians were still furious at Emperor Franz Joseph for threatening to side against them in the Crimean War, effectively forcing them to concede defeat. The Prussians had also stood by the Russians in a recent rebellion in Poland, whereas the Austrians had not. The British, for their part, had no great love for either side and had no reason to care who won.

Bismarck, von Roon & von Moltke

Bismarck had only to prod Austria with the right words for Emperor Franz Joseph to demand a resolution of the Holstein issue by the German Imperial Diet which violated a treaty between Austria and Prussia, which was all Bismarck needed to go to war. Many have since pondered why the Austrian Emperor did such a thing after having been previously baited into a failed war with France and Piedmont-Sardinia not so long before. The most common explanation is that Austria was still not really looking toward the German states so much as the other ethnicities within the Austrian Empire, which were rather restive. The Hungarians, who had come under much more strict control since the Revolution of 1848, were looking particularly troublesome. The Emperor may have been hoping that a war with Prussia and Italy would unite the ethnic groups behind Austrian leadership and strengthen the empire.

In any event, on June 14, 1866 the war began with Prussian troops marching into Saxony and Bohemia. The Prussian army had mobilized rapidly thanks to the adept leadership of war minister Graf von Roon and the army commander Graf von Moltke. The Italian Royal Army was less well prepared, with elements of the north and south still not having coalesced very well. Some of this was due to personality issues, some due to organizational differences and sometimes simply the differences between the dialects of Turin and Naples. The Italian war plan was for the army of General Alfonso La Marmora to strike while the army of General Enrico Cialdini remained on the defensive. They would have superior numbers but the Austrians, with their powerful fortress cities of the Quadrilateral, would be able to concentrate their troops against any threat. The Italians, in typical fashion, came straight on with a bold offensive by the troops of La Marmora, accompanied by King Vittorio Emanuele II himself, who loved nothing better than being on campaign.

Archduke Albrecht

The Austrians were led by Archduke Albrecht, Duke of Teschen, the Emperor’s cousin and a veteran of Radetzky’s victorious army from the First War of Italian Independence. He was not content to remain on the defensive but moved his army around to the north in an effort to get behind the Italians, cut them off from their base of operations and assault them from the rear. As it happened, the Italian army turned at just the right moment and the two sides collided at the Battle of Custoza on June 24. It was a very confused fight. The Austrian cavalry charged in, were mostly wiped out but spread confusion that stymied a sizeable number of Italian units. The Austrians drove the Italians out of Oliosi and seemed to be winning the day, yet were then met by an Italian division that exploited the gaps in their lines and refused to be dislodged, repelling fierce and repeated Austrian attacks at Monte Croce. The Austrians thought they were beaten, yet the Italians did not immediately reinforce Monte Croce and finally the forces there began to fall back. When reinforcements were sent and the Austrians moved to match them, the Austrians left another gap in their lines but the Italians failed to exploit it.

The Battle of Custozza

Each army believed they had been beaten, though neither actually had been. However, it was La Marmora who was the first to take action on this mistaken assumption and he ordered a retreat. As his forces moved back to secure the bridges over the Mincio, gaps in the Italian lines opened up which the Austrians were quick to exploit and Italian losses were heavy. By the end of the day, the Italians had retreated across the river after losing 8,147 men compared to losses of 5,650 for the Austrians. However, Archduke Albrecht did not follow up to destroy the Italian army, viewing his army as too bloodied and too exhausted to continue. As it was, most of the Italian losses had been men who were captured, as far as the number of dead and wounded alone went, Austrian losses were considerably higher. The Archduke retired to Verona, fearful of exposing his forces in case the French decided to get involved. Emperor Franz Joseph had advised him to ignore any political consideration and focus on annihilating the Italians, however, Archduke Albrecht seemed more concerned in not repeating the disaster that had befallen Franz Joseph himself at Solferino. As it was, Austria had won a solid victory and removed itself from immediate danger on the Italian front.

Battle of Bezzecca

In fact, the Austrian Empire seemed to be doing exceedingly well in the opening weeks of the conflict. They had defeated the Italians at Custoza and soon after halted the Prussians at Trautenau and the Austrian-allied forces of the Kingdom of Hanover also defeated the Prussians at Langensalza. However, at that point, everything began to go wrong. Only two days later the Hanoverians surrendered and the Prussians bested the Austrians at Gitschin on June 29. Most devastating of all for Austria was the decisive Prussian victory at the Battle of Koeniggraetz (Sadowa) on July 3. Subsequent defeats followed and in Italy, a small force under Giuseppe Garibaldi, who was still full of fight, was on the attack in the Trentino while the Italian high command planned their own counter-offensive. On July 21, Garibaldi and his “Hunters of the Alps” were attacked by two Austrian columns led by Major General Franz Baron von Kuhn at the town of Bezzecca. The Italians immediately counter-attacked and though they took heavier losses, managed to drive the Austrians out, providing a much needed morale boost for the Italian forces.

Battle of Lissa

The Italian war effort seemed to be on the rebound. General Cialdini was on the advance, this time with La Marmora holding back to cover the Austrian fortresses, Garibaldi had won a hard fought victory at Bezzecca and the Italian navy, widely regarded as the vastly superior force, was preparing to land troops on the Adriatic island of Lissa off the Dalmatian coast. However, it was then that everything was spoiled by the greatest disaster of the war for Italy. To the surprise of all, the much smaller Austrian fleet of Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff, attacked the Italian fleet while they were preparing to land their forces. The Italian commander, Admiral Count Carlo di Persano, was caught off guard and seemed totally bewildered. Two Italian ironclad warships were sunk while the Austrians lost none of their own, though one unarmored steamer was badly damaged. The Italians retreated and the Austrian sailors cheered. Ironically, most of the “Austrian” sailors were actually Italians, from Venice. It was a humiliating blow for Italy which was not helped by the fact that Persano first reported that he had won a great victory. This made it very awkward, needless to say, and all the worse when the truth came out.

The outcome of the war had, for all intents and purposes, mostly been decided at the Battle of Sadowa with the Prussians crushing the Austrian army there. However, the Austrian reinforcements on their way to Italy, combined with the stunning loss at Lissa, prompted Italy to come to the peace table too, in spite of the advances of Garibaldi and Cialdini and the hopes riding on them to make good on the loss at Custoza. It was not the glorious victory that had been hoped for, nor would the resulting peace treaty be easy for anyone. Italy was on the winning side but Prussia had been the ones to force Austria to the negotiating table. Even then, it was only thanks to the intransigence of Bismarck as most of the Prussian officers wanted to carry on and capture Vienna and perhaps more. Bismarck would not hear of it. All he wanted was a war to shove Austria out of the way so that Prussia could create a united Germany. He had no desire to see Austria humiliated or destroyed.

King Vittorio Emanuele II enters Venice

However, the Austrians were still Austrian and while they could grudgingly accept being beaten by Prussia, they would still insist on being condescending to the hated Italians. They refused to concede anything to Italy, yet Prussia was bound by their alliance not to make peace unless Venice was restored to Italy. However, the Austrian Empire refused to budge on this and so Prussia and Italy had to turn to Emperor Napoleon III of the French, who had been on side but taken no part in the conflict. The result was rather ridiculous. Austria finally agreed to make peace but by ceding Venice to the French Empire at which point the French then handed Venice over to the Kingdom of Italy. In a way, however, it was rather fitting given that Austria had first acquired Venice by originally dividing the Venetian territories with the first French Republic. So it was that Prussia proved to the minor German states that Austria would not be looked to for leadership and, after the appropriate referendum, Venice was annexed to the Kingdom of Italy.

An unfortunate result of the Austrian intransigence during the peace process was to perpetuate the false impression that Italy had accomplished nothing during the war. The Italians had won battles and the naval engagement of Lissa was the only truly embarrassing loss. The battle of Custoza was two armies that basically fought each other to exhaustion, both thought they had lost and the Italians were simply the first to do anything about it and as they began to pull back the Austrians pounced. Garibaldi had won a hard fought victory in the north, the Italians had not been destroyed and were in the process of counter-attacking, were advancing back into Venetia, when the crushing victory of the Prussians brought the war to a close. The Austrians had not ‘run away with it’ so to speak. In any event, Italy had at least regained Venice, leaving only Rome still under foreign occupation. Prussia was clearly established as the leading German state, only one further step away from unification whereas the Austrian Empire had been humbled and was soon thereafter forced to make vast concessions to the Hungarians, leading to the compromise which turned the Austrian Empire into the “Dual Monarchy” of Austria-Hungary.

A Case for Italian Unification

Some time ago it was brought to my attention that I had never set down my exact thoughts on Italian unification. It has certainly been covered here, the facts are there for all to see, the sequence of events, etc. I would think most regular readers would be aware that I favored it, even if the way it came about is not what I would consider ideal. However, my overall thoughts on the subject have been lacking and since this is something which tends to divide monarchists (one of oh-so-many things), I thought I might as well put forward my opinions and make a case in defense of the unification of Italy since not a few (non-Italian) monarchists tend to take an extremely hostile view to the very existence of a united Italy. I will try to refute the most common arguments against unification that I have encountered and try to explain why I think it was a positive development and could have been even more positive had it been done sooner.

First of all, I think it is a mistake to consider opposition to Italian unification to be something reactionary. Yet, this tends to be how support or opposition to unification is framed; the revolutionaries were for it, the reactionaries were against it. However, Italian nationalists were not trying to establish something new at least in terms of having a united Italy under one government. Long before there was a Grand Duchy of Tuscany, a Papal States, a Kingdom of the Two-Sicilies or a Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, there had been a united Italy ruled by one government in Rome. It was the Roman Empire, the Roman Republic with a history stretching back to traceless antiquity. It had also lasted quite a long time. In wishing to have all of the Italian peninsula united together under one government in Rome, the nationalists were aiming to restore something that had already existed rather than construct something totally new. Of course, the government itself would be new but the idea of unification itself was not. The history of Imperial Rome loomed large in the collective memory of all Italians as it was bound to. When a good chunk of your historical timeline consists of a period when you ruled practically the entire known world, that is something that casts a very long shadow.

All throughout the Dark Ages, the Middle Ages and the rise of the city-states and especially the color, chaos and culture of the Renaissance the legacy of Imperial Rome was ever-present. It spoke clearly to every Italian that they had been and were capable of being so much more than a patchwork collection of feuding city-states and a battleground for foreign powers. This is also proven by the fact that Italian unification was a dream for a great many people long before the Nineteenth Century. During the Renaissance, it was often the Popes who took the lead in trying to reestablish a united Italy under their control. It was the French and the Germans that the “Warrior Pope” Julius II referred to when he fought his wars to drive the “barbarians” out of Italy. Ultimately, he got much farther in realizing his goal than anyone would have thought possible. Later on, Pope Clement VII tried the same thing but with much less success. Even back in the Middle Ages there had been a foreshadowing of these struggles when Pope Alexander III called for Italian unity and formed the Lombard League to thwart the invasion of the German Emperor Frederick Barbarossa.

The primary point here though is that Italian unification was not, in itself, a “revolutionary” idea. It was a concept with more history and tradition behind it than in any other European nation-state. The difference, of course, was in what sort of form a united, or re-united, Italy would take. Many of those who object to the existence of the united Italy, formerly the Kingdom of Italy, base their position on their dislike of the sort of state that existed in Piedmont-Sardinia under the House of Savoy and what is sometimes seen as a Savoyard conquest of Italy rather than a unification such as was seen in other countries. However, things were not so neat and clean in those other countries either and Italy always seems to be held to a different standard in this regard. There is no comparable objection, after all, to united nation-states in France, Britain, Spain or Germany; why is Italy different? Why are the Italian people considered singularly unworthy of something so many others take for granted?

After all, no one would claim that France or Spain or Germany absolutely cannot be unified and must be ruled by outsiders. Are the dialects of Turin, Florence and Naples more alien to each other than Catalan and Castilian, English and Cornish, Welsh or Gaelic, High and Low German? Are the divisions imposed on Italy by foreign invaders more legitimate than the divisions that resulted from the foreign invasion of Spain? There seems to be no equivalent. Most seem to agree that the French were understandably opposed to a large portion of their country being ruled by England and that the Spanish were understandably indignant at being ruled by Moors and yet some seem to think that Italians should have been content to see their homeland being ruled by Spanish, French and German authorities. The divisions in Italy were very old, it is true but the regimes that existed at the time of the Italian Wars for Independence were not so deep-rooted as some seem to think. Certainly none could match the history of the venerable House of Savoy which had been ruling some patch of ground, be it great or small, for many, many centuries longer than most of the other royal houses represented on the Italian peninsula had existed even in their own homelands much less on Italian soil.

The rule of the Spanish Bourbons over Parma came as recently as 1847. Their rule over Sicily came in 1735 prior to which more than ten different dynasties in their turn had reigned over the island before them. Hapsburg rule over Modena dated only since 1814 with time for only two to reign. Likewise, the Austrian Hapsburgs had ruled over Lombardy-Venetia only since the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and which they had gained, not by inheritance or marriage but by negotiation with the First French Republic, later confirmed by the Congress of Vienna. All of these were fresh-faced newcomers compared to the royals of the House of Savoy who had ruled over their own homeland since at least 1003 and over Sardinia since 1720. No power on the Italian peninsula had a deeper tradition and a longer history in the region than their own save for one, which was, of course, the Papal States. The Papal States are probably the easiest thing to point to in an effort to explain why Italy is treated differently from other countries in regards to unification. Politics and conflicting nationalities can be trouble enough but add religion to the mix and you get a very volatile cocktail indeed.

First of all, as should be obvious at this point, the total opposition of pontiffs such as Gregory XVI and (belatedly) Pius IX to Italian unification was the innovation. In the past, it was the popes who had often most longed and worked for Italian unification such as with Alexander III and the Lombard League or Clement VII and the League of Cognac along with others. Of course, in those days, while the Papal States may not have had considerably more political power than in the time of Pius IX, the Pope certainly had more prestige and would naturally have been the leader of any sort of Italian confederation. By the 19th Century the political strength of the Catholic Church had been all but eliminated, partly because of the enemies of the Church but also partly by papal policies themselves. On the international stage, even many devoutly Catholic countries had come to view the papacy as being unreliable and all but incapable of impartiality. One of the primary reasons for this was the lack of Italian unification itself. Looking back, it put the political power of the Pope at odds with the power and prestige of the Catholic Church as a whole even if few could look past their own interests to see it that way.

Pope Alexander III giving a blessed sword
the Doge of Venice

Consider the course of history: Once the popes gained political control of Rome and central Italy their primary goal in foreign policy was to maintain and expand that control. However, because the Papal States could never be powerful enough to withstand the major powers of the time, the pontiffs adopted a policy of playing one against the other, usually France and Germany/Austria. The Spanish were involved as well but eventually as a subsidiary of either the French or Germans. The pattern is replayed over and over throughout the centuries. One pope supports the Germans against the French, then when the Germans become too powerful, another pope supports the French against the Germans. Of course, the popes were not the only cause of this as the French, Germans and Spanish were also always eager on their own to fight over territories in an attempt to dominate Italy. There were so many of these conflicts that a number of them have simply been grouped together by historians and named “The Italian Wars”. Naturally, all the energy, lives and treasure poured into these conflicts by the Catholic monarchies could have, from a Catholic point of view, been better spent fighting the Turks or later the Protestants. Lutheranism might have been crushed in its infancy had not the German Emperor Charles V devoted so much of his forces to fighting the Pope and his French ally. The Turks, likewise, might have been defeated had not the French allied with them in order to thwart the Germans.

This was a common theme for practically the whole of history from the time of the fall of the Roman Empire until the reunification of the Italian peninsula, since before the time that Charlemagne clashed with King Desiderius of the Lombards until the Battle of Solferino between Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph and French Emperor Napoleon III the Italians have seen their country serve as the battleground, fought over by those great Catholic powers to dominate them with the Pope usually in the middle of it, supporting one side or the other. There had also been Italian states and rulers that fostered the division, supporting whichever side seemed strongest at the time and which would offer the most to them for their allegiance. Many popes complained about this habit of their countrymen, not that they were not above behaving in a similar fashion but because the small states tended to support whichever side was stronger (often the German Emperor) while the Pope tended to oppose that same side as it would pose the greatest threat to his continued rule over Rome. When Catholics think about this long and ugly succession of wars, the “Investiture Dispute”, the “Italian Wars”, the “Sack of Rome” there must surely be some, even among the most partisan, who can at least understand the wish that Italy had simply been left to the Italians and had all the Catholic powers concentrate on their common enemies rather than fighting each other endlessly for control of the Italian peninsula.

Opposites who agreed Mazzini would be a disaster

Even to the very end, when Catholic France and Austria were both about to be surpassed by Protestant Prussia they still found themselves drawn into conflict over Italy because each side feared that their loss would be the other’s gain. Likewise, as the Italians themselves tired of this cycle, opposition to at least the political power of the Church if not the Church itself began to grow in Italy as people came to see the Church as being on the side of their oppressors. Why did women have to be flogged in Milan by Austrians so that the Pope could continue to rule in Rome? Past papal support for unification abruptly turned into adamant opposition, partly because of an understandable level of paranoia that persisted after the French Revolution. However, Italians had finally had enough and if the Pope would not be with them, they would be against him. This gave rise to the dangerous movement of Giuseppe Mazzini and his radical republicans. However, the Italians were not alone in this unfortunate move to the left. It happened in other countries as the Pope stood opposed to any disorder even if it meant Catholics being ruled by non-Catholic foreigners in countries from Ireland to Poland. The difference was that in Ireland and Poland the Pope could be more easily ignored than in Italy where he ruled.

By the time that Pius IX came to the papal throne Italian unification was probably inevitable. It was going to happen, the only question was which form would it take; a radical republic or a constitutional monarchy? In regards to the Church, there was, early on, also a choice between a secular republic or a monarchy/confederation of monarchies in which the Pope would have a leadership role. This was an idea supported by a fair number of people but which the Pope ultimately opposed, even placing the book which suggested it on the “Index of Forbidden Works”. Papal foreign policy also worked to create an impossible position for the Papal States. Pope Pius IX, a devout and saintly man without question, had an extremely erratic foreign policy that caused Italians who had revered him to come to view him as being under the power of others or else extremely unreliable while at the same time alienating his strongest supporters so that, ultimately, his political power rested solely on the armed force of a regime which staunch Catholic monarchists regarded as illegitimate. So erratic were his policies that it can leave one wondering at times if even he knew which “side” he was ultimately on.

The "Honest King"

For example, when considering why the Savoy monarchy prevailed in Italy when all others ultimately failed, one factor was King Victor Emmanuel II as the “honest king”. Does this mean he was more truthful and sincere in all his dealings than other monarchs in Italy? Certainly not, as even his most ardent admirers would have to admit. However, that reputation stems mostly from the fact that the Savoy monarchy was the only monarchy in Italy to grant a constitution and stick to it (the constitution being one which ultimately reserved considerable authority to the monarch and was vague enough to be interpreted in a number of ways). Everyone else, from Tuscany to the Two Sicilies to the Papal States themselves granted constitutions and then revoked them. This gave them all the public perception of being false and untrustworthy compared to the Savoy at the time. As stated, Pius IX was no exception. One could argue that he simply made a mistake in trying to make the Papal States a constitutional monarchy when trying to compartmentalize the papal offices of political ruler and spiritual ruler was extremely difficult to say the least. He also gave every indication of siding with the nationalists, and not necessarily the reluctant monarchist nationalists but the revolutionaries.

When he condemned Austria for violating papal territory in Ferrara, issuing a sharp rebuke that forced them to withdraw, he acted in defense of his own political power, which went hand-in-hand with the sovereignty of his estates. To the public, however, it was the patriotic Italian Pope driving away the German “barbarians”. Even the anti-clerical Mazzini was praising him as the most powerful man in Europe. When he granted a constitution to the Papal States it was based on that of the July Monarchy of the “Citizen-King” Louis Philippe in France. His chief ministers were revolutionaries, many of whom had been exiled or imprisoned by his predecessor but which Pius IX had set at liberty and appointed to high office. What was your average layman to think of all this? His most famous prime minister, the murdered Rossi, had supported Napoleon’s general Murat against the Austrians. When Murat was overthrown he went to France and was a supporter of the July Monarchy and came to serve the Pope after the downfall of Louis-Philippe. An earlier prime minister, of the Rovere family, had been exiled for rebellion against Gregory XVI as a revolutionary and who had not returned to Italy even when Pius IX granted an amnesty at his accession because he refused to take the oath of loyalty to the Pope. He later worked in the Cavour government in Piedmont-Sardinia for Italian unification under the monarchy. To replace him, Pius IX appointed Count Edoardo Fabbri, another former revolutionary who had been exiled and imprisoned by Gregory XVI.

The "Angelic Pope"

Since granting a constitutional government, Pius IX had appointed to leadership four men in succession who had each been punished as revolutionaries by his predecessor. Again, what message did this send to the public other than that the Pope supported the movement for Italian unity and independence which all of these men had in the past been punished as revolutionaries for fighting for? When the First War of Italian Independence broke out, Pius IX finally lost the love of the nationalist movement when he sent a papal army to the frontier, commanded by a Piedmontese general from the Savoy monarchy who was a passionate supporter of Italian unity and independence, only to then send orders after them that they were not to cross the frontier and not to engage the Austrians. To say the public was confused by this would be an understatement. They would have been even more confused to have read the message Pope Pius IX sent to the Austrian Emperor the following month in which he said:

“…in Our Allocution of the 29th of last month, We asserted that to declare war would revolt Our paternal heart; and announced Our ardent desire to contribute towards the restoration of peace. Let it not be therefore displeasing to your Majesty that we should address an appeal to your piety and religion, and exhort you with paternal affection to withdraw your arms from a war which can never reconquer for your empire the minds of the Lombards and Venetians; and can only bring with it the fatal series of calamities that always accompany war, and are certainly both repulsive and detestable to yourself.

   “…We are confident that the German nation itself, being honestly proud of its own nationality, will not engage its honor in an attempt to shed the blood of this Italian nation; but will rather engage it in nobly recognizing her as a sister - for both are Our daughters and very dear to Us; let each of them be content to live within her own borders by honorable agreement and beneath the blessing of the Lord.”

So, here again was Pope Pius IX speaking of an Italian nation and asking Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph to withdraw his forces from Italy so that Italian-speaking and German-speaking Catholics might live peacefully in their own countries. They are words which illustrate the holiness and goodwill of the Pope as well as his inability to grasp the reality of power politics. The idea that the Austrian Emperor would have ever simply ordered his troops to leave Italian soil and march home, shaking the dust from their boots at the border, out of goodwill and Christian brotherhood is simply absurd. Yet, this same pontiff would later reverse all of that, encouraging Austria to send more troops to occupy even more of Italy (though they did not) and punishing as much as was in his power to punish anyone who backed the idea of an Italian nation. Is it any wonder that at some point many people simply stopped listening?

As stated above, past popes had been ardent supporters of Italian unification and removing all French or German presence from Italy. Yet, when events came together to make that a reality, the pope of the day reversed course and opposed it. Was it out of fear of losing his territory and what was, at that time, his primary source of income? For someone like Pius IX that hardly seems likely. Most likely it was due to his opposition to the policies of a “free Church in a free state” championed by Cavour and his fear of being dependent on the Italian government (and thus a future pontiff could become their instrument). However, if the Pope had at least tried to negotiate with the Piedmontese it is at least possible that the policies he disapproved of could have been amended or abolished. To have the papal blessing on the new Kingdom of Italy would have been hugely beneficial and the King at least showed a willingness to do almost anything to obtain his consent. However, by refusing to deal at all with the idea and later the fact of a unified Italy, the Pope left himself entirely at the mercy of his political enemies, not just the Italian nationalists in general but his very enemies of the radical, anti-clerical faction of the Turin government, which is exactly what his defiance was supposed to prevent.

That is one of the major problems, as I see it, that presents itself to those who say that the opposition of the Pope was necessary in order to maintain the independence of the Church. For one thing, the existence of the Papal States had not proven such a guarantee in the past. This was why popes shifted in their foreign policy constantly between favoring the French and the Germans in turn. It has certainly not been the case since the Lateran agreements. The Papal States have never nor is Vatican City today capable of using force to prevent it being conquered by a foreign power and the Pope today receives income from the Italian state. It was not the state of affairs that existed at the establishment of the Church in Rome or the earliest centuries of the existence of the papal position. Popes were then part of the Roman Empire and all depended on their own moral fortitude to not be the puppets of the Emperor and so most were not, many early popes accepting martyrdom rather than submit to un-Christian or anti-Christian policies. They did the right thing not because they had territory, taxes or an army at their command but because they chose to even if it meant their death if they did not. Of course, Pius IX nor any of his successors had to face such a choice. What they did face was the choice of which state to depend on for their security and freedom. There were not many offers but Pius IX chose to depend on Napoleon III of France. When the French army was withdrawn and Italian troops occupied Rome it was only by the grace of King Victor Emmanuel II that the Pope was left untouched in the Vatican, it having been proven by that time that no other power was able or willing to make war on his behalf. Would there not have been just as much risk of future corruption if the Pope had continued to depend solely on the French rather than the Italians? Given the subsequent course of French history, he may in fact have been much worse off.

In any event, trying to play a strictly legitimist game in this regard ultimately goes nowhere. The states of Italy were parceled out and shifted ownership from one monarch or state to another over the centuries based on force or mutual agreement. In the case of the Papal States one could go all the way back to the Dark Ages and the agreements between the Pope and the Frankish monarch in which each granted the other titles they themselves had no strictly legitimist right to bestow. One could go back farther and see the Pope submitting to the authority of the earliest King of Italy, Flavius Odoacer, after the fall of the Western Roman Empire while still being, in strictly legitimist terms, the subject of the Eastern Roman Emperor in Constantinople with no thought being given then of any claim to independent sovereignty. At some point you have to accept the facts as they exist and go from there as best you can. In the case of Italy in the Nineteenth Century, the fact on the ground was that unification was going to happen, whether under a republican radical like Mazzini or Catholic monarch like King Victor Emmanuel II. I prefer the King.

As stated before, putting aside all of the details, I also see no reason why Italy should be denied what other peoples have not; to unite together and aspire to greatness. Unlike many others, the Italians have their Roman ancestors to look back to and it seems just as natural to me for them to do so as it would be for any people to look back to their period of greatest power and prestige and wish to emulate it as much as possible. The Germans tried to emulate the Roman example particularly and I can hardly see expecting the Italians to desist from doing the same considering it was their own ancestors that were being looked to. I have also been fortunate to speak to a number of praiseworthy Italian monarchists over the years who are carrying on a most difficult struggle and it pains me that they should be attacked from within as well as without.

If the royal houses involved as well as the Pope can be reconciled to the Italian nation, it seems hardly unreasonable to expect monarchists to do the same. National identity is something that is under attack these days, in Europe particularly by the internationalists of the European Union. There have been efforts to divide Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom and I have opposed them all. Italy has not been untouched by these efforts but, thankfully, there is still a strong sense of patriotism in Italy and I would hate to see monarchists make themselves the enemies of it. I would hate it both because it would be a betrayal of the valiant Italian monarchists and because I fear it would be yet another self-defeating position. Choosing to be a monarchist is difficult enough in this day and age, I would hate to see Italians who are inclined toward monarchy to be told that they must choose between their country and the cause of kings to be accepted by the monarchist community. The unification may not have come about in an ideal way but that is something rare in history. It did happen and I thank God it resulted in a Kingdom of Italy with a Catholic Royal Family rather than in a secular, Mazzinian republic. To see Italy restored as a strongly Catholic monarchy, based on Italian culture and traditions, is my sincerest wish. I hope that more monarchists outside of Italy would share it.

The Thousand Lands in Sicily

It was on May 11, 1860 that Giuseppe Garibaldi and his “Thousand” red shirts landed at Marsala on the island of Sicily to instigate the uprising against the Bourbon rule of King Francesco II. Although an independent operation, Garibaldi was certainly not without outside support or sympathy. Elements within the government in Turin certainly supported him (as did pan-Italian nationalists in general but this was a stateless group) and beyond the Italian peninsula there were numerous sympathetic governments, one of the most prominent being that of Great Britain (and not just because they appreciated the fashion-sense of his army). It helps to explain how such a seemingly hopeless and even farcical operation turned out to be such a stunning success. After all, it seems incredible that an invasion force of a thousand men could end up bringing down the entire Kingdom of the Two-Sicilies; that long-time Spanish bastion in the south of Italy. Actually, “The Thousand” were probably not even that numerous and they consisted, for the most part, of volunteers drawn from across northern Italy, unfamiliar with Sicily and unaccustomed to the harsher climate of the south. Some were not even Italians at all such as the Hungarian Legion of Italia which fought enthusiastically for the famous Garibaldi after having their own nationalist movement thwarted. How could such a rag-tag group be victorious?

The Kingdom of the Two-Sicilies certainly has the reputation of being a place one would not expect to find much sympathy for a revolutionary like Garibaldi. It has long been known as a very conservative, Catholic, absolute monarchy in traditional Spanish style. However, that proved to be part of the downfall of the kingdom and part of the reason for the lack of international support for the status quo and a pro-Garibaldi attitude from the British in particular. Ever since the Congress of Vienna the “Great Powers” had been most concerned with peace and stability, keeping rebellion from ever breaking out anywhere for fear of it spreading as in the past. The British (and most other northern European monarchies such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and even Prussia to a degree) firmly believed that the best way to ensure stability as through a constitutional monarchy that provided for some level of popular representation. Effectively, to give the people enough of a voice that they would feel they had some control over the national destiny but never enough to actually determine policy. This, the accepted thinking went, would make the public less susceptible to the arguments of the revolutionaries who wanted the people to rise up and overthrow the monarchy. This is why, in Spain, for example, the French and the British supported the liberal monarchists of the Queen mother rather than the absolute monarchists of Don Carlos. Or at least it was one reason.

King Ferdinando II of the Two-Sicilies, part of the Spanish Royal Family, annoyed the British by siding with Don Carlos. They were also concerned by the growing discontent in the Two-Sicilies and the increasing support for a republican revolution. Why were the British or French concerned at all? What was Sicily to them? The answer, of course, was that Sicily was right next to the British naval bastion of Malta and straddled the main seaway to the Suez Canal which was just starting to be built the year before Garibaldi and his men landed at Marsala. The French and British were therefore greatly concerned about any unrest that might disturb this enterprise upon which so much of global commerce was to depend. The British even sent warships to encourage the Neapolitan navy to stay away while Garibaldi and his men were landing (once the troops had disembarked the Neapolitans destroyed one ship and captured the other).

When Garibaldi landed, his forces were not opposed at all. The Neapolitan army, while not exactly having the best reputation in the world, should have been able to swamp such a tiny group with their massive numerical superiority if nothing else. However, King Francesco II inexplicably failed to take decisive action such as leading the army himself. Compounding the problem was the fact that his forces often did more to turn the local population against the monarchy than stopping the invaders. On May 14 Garibaldi declared himself ‘Duce’ of Sicily in the name of King Vittorio Emanuele II of Piedmont-Sardinia and the following day met the Neapolitan army for their first battle. The result was the unimpressive battle of Calatafimi which amounted to a victory for Garibaldi despite being outnumbered 2-to-1. It helped that the Neapolitan commanders seemed to be equal parts incompetent and vindictive. Previously, the one, reliable hardcore of the Bourbon forces had been the Swiss mercenary guard. However, they had earlier gone on strike for better pay and King Francesco II responded by having them all massacred; which was probably not the best idea.

Garibaldi captured Palermo and his ranks slowly grew as locals volunteered to join him. The Neapolitan army also had a problem with desertion. A key element was the local aristocracy who responded in various ways to the crisis, none of them very helpful to Francesco II. Some fled the island immediately as soon as Garibaldi landed and these were those most supportive of the Bourbon monarchy. Obviously, they would be no help. Most, however, considered the cause of Francesco II lost and decided to make common cause with Garibaldi who promised to respect their rights and privileges. This would later cause a degree of rebellion and banditry by those peasants who felt Garibaldi had sold them out by not tearing down the aristocracy completely and redistributing their lands. King Ferdinando II had shown that he would do whatever was necessary to maintain his rule, be it promising a constitution only to revoke it later or shooting down rebels and shelling entire cities to rubble. If he had still been around things might have been different but few had confidence that Francesco II was made of such tough stuff. The pragmatic types looked at the situation and reasoned that the Bourbons were doomed and their only options for the future would be a united Italy ruled by Giuseppe Mazzini and his radical republicans or a constitutional monarchy ruled by King Vittorio Emanuele II. Mazzini was unthinkable so these invariably suppressed their distaste for Garibaldi and supported his red shirt army to maintain the existing social order.

Rebel forces soon besieged Palermo, with disastrous consequences for the Neapolitan side. Political prisoners were broken out of jail, causing panic in the rear and the commanding Neapolitan general seemingly lost his nerve and ordered a retreat only to then order his artillery to shell the city indiscriminately, killing hundreds of civilians, many of whom must have been loyal to the Bourbon monarchy. Naturally, this made the cause of the King in Naples all the more unpopular (though he, of course, had nothing to do with it). Still, more Neapolitan troops arrived and the city might have been retaken but the commanding general, whether due to befuddled panic or simply corruption, decided to surrender. The Neapolitan troops began withdrawing from the island, even where they held the upper hand, and in their absence several peasant rebellions broke out. These were then suppressed by Garibaldi’s red shirts which, again, bewildered many of the locals who had envisioned him as their liberator. These rebels, however, were typical of the types who would have seized power and set up a revolutionary republic if not for the presence of Garibaldi who was moderating his more radical inclinations to win the support of powers like Piedmont-Sardinia and Great Britain.

In a last, desperate effort to avoid disaster and win back popular support, King Francesco II issued a constitution in June but it was to no avail. After the “now you see it, now you don’t” constitutions of his father, very few people were prepared to believe that the King was serious about constitutional government and simply ignored him. More volunteers joined Garibaldi though the Neapolitan army still had some sizeable garrisons on the island. In July Garibaldi captured Milazzo with 5,000 men after the overall Neapolitan commander refused to reinforce the garrison there. His caution did him no good and a few days later he surrendered Messina to Garibaldi by which time it was the rebels who held a significant numerical advantage and the remaining garrisons surrendered quickly. Throwing caution to the wind (and alarming the government in Turin) Garibaldi wasted no time and transferred his forces over to the mainland at Calabria. After that, a string of victories ensued as many Neapolitan forces deserted, some even joining the red shirts and most of those who did offer resistance did so with little support or coordination. The army and navy seemed to melt away, King Francesco II fled Naples and made his last stand at Gaeta.

The Neapolitans were still able to slightly outnumber the forces of Garibaldi and might have defeated him, at least temporarily, were it not for the arrival of the Piedmontese army under King Vittorio Emanuele II who was alarmed at how fast and far the red shirts were advancing and just a little concerned about how genuine their newfound monarchist sympathy was. Between them, Gaeta was doomed (though it would hold out until early the following year) and at the bridge of Teano on October 26, 1860 General Garibaldi and King Vittorio Emanuele II met, bringing their forces together and joining, from that time ever since, the north and the south of Italy together for the first time since the days of the old Roman Empire. In March of 1861 the unified Kingdom of Italy was officially proclaimed. It was not something that either the new King of Italy or even his first minister Cavour had planned for in advance. Even his royal predecessor, King Carlo Alberto, had only ever had ambitions to unite northern Italy. However, just as in those days, the drive to end foreign rule and unite the Italian people was such that it became a race between the republicans of Mazzini and the monarchists of the King of Piedmont to see who would accomplish the act and establish the first real Italian government since Roman times. There was plenty of tragedy along the way, but between those two competing ideologies, it is fortunate that it was the King who reached the goal first.

Monarchist Profile: Vincenzo Gioberti

During the era of the unification of Italy, few people were so well known as Vincenzo Gioberti. Today, however, he is seldom remembered at all despite the fact that his writings were some of the most widely read in his own time. He had an exalted view of religion yet was often condemned by the religious authorities of the day. He was a member of revolutionary organizations but was a zealous monarchist. The plan he put forward for the unification of the Italian people, based on cooperation between Turin and Rome, was accepted by both the Pope and the King of Piedmont-Sardinia. The problem was that they were never able to accept it at the same time. When one embraced it, the other rejected it and when the other finally came around to accepting it as well the one had passed the point of such an agreement. It must have been maddeningly frustrating for Gioberti but he was a man who often found himself at odds with those who championed the most; his Church and his monarch. However, had his ideas been accepted, there is no doubt that the unification and early history of the united Italy would have been considerably different.

Vincenzo Gioberti was born on April 5, 1801 in Turin, in the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia and early in life he decided on a religious career. He trained for the priesthood with the fathers of the Oratory and in 1825 was ordained priest. As a young priest he was influenced by the writings of the revolutionary republican Giuseppe Mazzini. He rejected his anti-clericalism but embraced the idea of Italian unity wholeheartedly. While others in the revolutionary camp looked to Freemasonry and the Carbonari to create a “new religious synthesis” in Italy, Gioberti believed that it was the Catholic Church that was the pride and glory of Italy and that it was the Churchy, under the leadership of the Papacy, that was uniquely qualified to lead the Italian people to national unity, renewed vitality and renewed greatness. Since the fall of Imperial Rome it had, after all, been the great Pontiffs of the Italian Renaissance who had come the closest to forging a pan-Italian political unity, which was also a time of artistic and scientific flowering. As Gioberti saw it, the Church was uniquely qualified to bring about such a rejuvenation against and that the Papacy was the one focus of unity that everyone had in common and which could bring together all Italians in a common cause.

This was music to the ears of the Piedmontese monarch King Carlo Alberto and he made Gioberti his court chaplain. Many, however, opposed Gioberti from the start because of the influence he had with the King. Many at court opposed his political views, fearing any change to the status quo. The fact that Gioberti was known as an Italian nationalist and an acquaintance of Mazzini, well known in the Young Italy movement, caused many to consider him dangerous. He himself had done nothing wrong and he had not a disloyal bone in his body but fears were running high and simply being on speaking terms with members of the group that was plotting republican revolution in Piedmont and the other Italian states was enough to bring the police down on him. Gioberti was also a prolific writer and philosopher whose ideas sometimes got him into trouble. He was critical of Pope Gregory XVI and the Jesuits and his speculations caused some in the Church to doubt his orthodoxy and in response to all this pressure in 1833 he resigned from his post at court. Nonetheless, his enemies pounced and he was arrested for conspiracy, imprisoned for a short time and then banished without ever having been given a trial. He went to Paris but spent most of his time in Brussels where he published his famous work ‘The Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians’ which was to become so widely read in 1843.

It was primarily this work by which Gioberti made the cause of Italian unification something that respectable, middle class people could get behind rather than being the exclusive domain of anti-clerical republicans and bomb-throwing revolutionaries. He recounted the glories of the civilization of the Italian people and in the cultural, non-political sphere, it was certainly the Papacy that was the most brilliant jewel of all. Gioberti envisioned a coming together of Rome and Turin, the spiritual greatness of the Holy See with the secular greatness of the Royal House of Savoy. He proposed that the princes of Italy grant representative government on their own local levels with consultative assemblies to advise but not govern the states. The states of Italy should then bind themselves together in a federation under the supra-national leadership of the Pope in order to have a common military, foreign policy, overseas colonies and a customs union while each state retained its own monarchy and unique local traditions. He rejected the republican nationalism of Mazzini which sought to weld all Italians from Turin to Naples into a single, uniform entity in favor of a more federal model of “consultative monarchies” which would be somewhat similar to what the German states eventually achieved several decades later.

Given how Italian history played out subsequently, many historians have dismissed the ideas of Gioberti as naively unrealistic. Yet, it was actually his vision which had the most history behind it. The last era of real Italian greatness had been the Renaissance period and during that time the Italian states were frequently united in a common cause by the leadership of the Pope. The most well known example was probably that of Pope Julius II who led Papal troops in person along with the other allied states to drive the “barbarians” out of Italy. However, even going back to the Middle Ages the Popes frequently arranged alliances of the Italian states toward a common goal or against a common threat. All Gioberti was really proposing was a more formalized and permanent version of what had existed at many points in the past throughout the course of Italian history. In that way, his vision was perhaps the most realistic of all. Gioberti embraced the cause of the Risorgimento whole-heartedly and he firmly believed that the Risorgimento could only truly flourish within the embrace of the Church. Second to the Papacy, his greatest loyalty and praise was reserved for his native ruler; the King of Piedmont-Sardinia who alone had the political and military muscle to see this plan brought to fruition. The Pope could make unity a fact and the Savoy could defend it.

Many people were won over by this argument, among them the future Pope Pius IX who read the book in which it was put forward in 1845. The next year, as Pope, it seemed to many that Pius IX was going perfectly step by step to put the vision of Gioberti into effect. He spoke of the Italian nation, authorized a consultative assembly for the Papal States and began encouraging greater unity and cooperation among the Italian princes. People across the peninsula cheered these moves and it seemed that Gioberti had truly shown the way for the best possible sort of unification. However, Gioberti had said that all depended on the alliance of Rome and Turin and it frustratingly seemed that when Turin favored his philosophy, Rome adamantly opposed it only to see Rome embrace the idea after Turin had discarded it. In 1848 Gioberti returned to his homeland and was warmly welcomed. King Carlo Alberto offered him a seat in the Piedmontese senate but, feeling unworthy, Gioberti turned it down. Still, he was elected to represent his home district in the Chamber of Deputies and eventually became Prime Minister of Piedmont-Sardinia. Finally in a position to put his ideas into effect, Gioberti immediately began trying to reconcile the opposing sides of the revolution, sending an envoy to the Pope, who had fled to Gaeta, with orders that he talk to the leaders of the Roman Republic along the way.

Needless to say, Mazzini refused to be convinced. He had, in fact, promoted Gioberti to write his famous “Primacy” by urging him to a write a ’catechism for the Risorgimento’ but Mazzini was totally opposed to what Gioberti reduced, despising what he called the “ultra-Romanism” of it as well as the glowing tributes to King Carlo Alberto. Gioberti’s ambassador received no warm welcome in Gaeta either with the Pope at first refusing to meet with the man at all. Since Gioberti had dared to even speak with the revolutionaries, the Pope refused to give him any hearing. Many have since said that if only the moderate Pellegrino Rossi (the Minister of Justice and the Interior of the Papal States) had not been assassinated and still close to Pius IX, everything might have turned out differently. However, from that point on the Pope adopted a different political attitude and there would be no movement toward a federation of monarchies as a method of achieving Italian unity, only the single monarchy or the republic.

Gioberti left office not long after the accession of King Vittorio Emanuele II and after disagreements with the government he left politics. He was sent on a diplomatic mission to Paris and remained there for the rest of his life, refusing a government pension or any religious assistance. He died of a stroke on October 26, 1852.

Soldier of Monarchy: General Giovanni Durando

General Giovanni Durando was one of the most prominent and controversial figures in the first war of Italian unification. During his career he has been called a patriot by some and a traitor to others. He was born in Mondovi on June 23, 1804 Giacomo Durando, a future leading Italian nationalist, and Blessed Marcantonio Durando were his brothers. Early on he set his sights on a military career and eventually gained a place in the Royal Guard of King Victor Emmanuel I of Piedmont-Sardinia in 1822. In a short span of time he became very caught up in the liberal movement that was sweeping Europe, first as a revolutionary and later as a committed monarchist of the moderate-liberal variety. With his brother he was forced to flee his homeland for a time for implication in a plot to force the very conservative King Charles Felix to accept a constitution and during his exile he gained ever more extensive military experience. He was a firm believer in liberal monarchy and saw it as the only way to preserve basic liberties without the chaos that would come with a revolutionary republic.

Between 1822 and 1842 Giovanni Durando served as a lieutenant in the Belgian Foreign Legion as a lieutenant, then as a captain in the Portuguese army fighting for Don Pedro and finally he moved to Spain where he rose to the rank of general fighting for the liberal monarchy there against the Carlists. Piedmont was never far from his thoughts though and he was happy to be repatriated home in 1842. Like most liberals he welcomed the election of Pope Pius IX who had been known for his liberal sympathies and his embrace of the idea of an Italian nationality. Indeed, for a time the unofficial anthem of the Italian nationalists was a hymn of praise to Pope Pius IX. For a time it was a widely held belief that for the long sought after goal of Italian unification to be achieved it would require the cooperation and partnership of the two dominant cities on the peninsula; Turin and Rome. While Piedmont-Sardinia worked to consolidate control over northern Italy, Giovanni Durando was among the Piedmontese party in Rome urging the Pope to embrace the cause of Italian unity under the moderating leadership of the House of Savoy.

For a time this seemed a real possibility as the Pope reprimanded an overzealous Austrian commander for an incursion on Papal territory and organized forces to show them the temporal power of the Papacy would not be violated by anyone. The Austrians backed down and it seemed that the Pope was on the side of the nationalists who went to war with Austria in 1848 when the outbreak of revolution in Vienna seemed to offer a golden opportunity. Pope Pius IX excited many more liberal hearts when he ordered Papal forces to march to the frontier of Romagna when hostilities broke out to ensure that the Austrians did not violate his territory. He chose two men to command that gave the liberals even more encouragement; General Giovanni Durando to command the majority (a Piedmontese monarchist known to favor unification) and Colonel Andrea Ferrari to command the Roman volunteers who was a liberal republican. Most took this as a sign that the Pope might have been, if anything, even more to the left than Durando.

Papal troops

However, this expedition led to a great controversy when General Durando actually engaged the Austrian army in cooperation with the forces of Piedmont-Sardinia (whose army also included many deserters from the Papal service). The Pope angrily denounced the affair saying that he had never ordered his army to cross the Po and fight the Austrians; he had only intended them to stand watch and rebuff any incursion of Papal territory. Neither the Pope nor his general emerged well from the affair. General Durando was defeated by the Austrians and his actions were later blamed for allowing the Austrians to concentrate their forces to overwhelm the main Piedmontese army under King Charles Albert. The Pope, likewise, came off looking either foolish or duplicitous for sending an army to a battlefront under the command of men ardently in favor of fighting the Austrians only to order them not to do so. Some in the army even believed the order was meant to be ignored and had been issued only to provide cover for the Pope if his troops were defeated by the Austrians. Obviously the Pope would never have acted so dishonestly, however his image was still sullied by those who believed him. Given his attitude it seemed incredible to have appointed a Piedmontese general known for his nationalist sympathies and support for Italian unity to organize, train and then command the Papal Army.

Italian troops in the Crimea

General Durando quit the Papal service when the Pope publicly condemned the war against Austria, which also saw a major shift in public opinion away from the Pope as many Italians took this as the Pope taking the side of Austria against his own people. Holding the rank of lieutenant general in the royal army of Piedmont-Sardinia, Durando continued to serve in the war against Austria, winning great fame for his defense of Vincenzo, and suppressed rebellions against royal authority in Sardinia where republican revolutionaries wished to seize leadership of the nationalist movement away from the royal court in Turin or simply to break away on their own. In 1855 he was sent with the Italian expedition to the Crimean War where the forces of King Victor Emmanuel II earned high praise at the battle of Chernaya and the siege of Sevastopol. In the Third Italian War of Independence General Durando was wounded at the disastrous battle of Custoza in 1866 where he commanded the I Corps. In 1860 he was appointed to the rank of Senator and after the formal proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy the following year was sent to command royal forces in the former Kingdom of the Two-Sicilies to wipe out the widespread banditry that had taken hold in the absence of a stable government. Serving his king to the last, he died in Florence on May 27, 1869.