tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8783969302315257415.post5408746713847560332..comments2024-03-16T01:00:19.876-05:00Comments on The Mad Monarchist: Monarchist Military: The Royal Italian Armed ForcesMadMonarchisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08083008336883267870noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8783969302315257415.post-54591889034617081182014-03-06T07:24:53.627-06:002014-03-06T07:24:53.627-06:00Thanks for your clean analysis, I did appreciate t...Thanks for your clean analysis, I did appreciate the impartiality that too often is lacking, talking about Italian military history. About WW1, I would add that General Cadorna was bonded to Napoleonic tactics, unable to pursue any dynamic action, wearing out his armies on the static front of Isonzo river, where hundreds of thousands of lives were spent, with no significant results. General Armando Diaz took over the command after Caporetto retreat, October 1917, changing the rules of the game. In WW2, I would add that before the break out and during the initial phases, Mussolini incredible ambitions were not limited by the military high commanders, who were too complaisant with the Duce, in order to keep their top chairs. Industrials played a negative heavy role, inducing the military establishment to accept old fashioned and low quality materials, that put the front lines in a dire condition of inferiority.<br />Thanks, Roberto Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04669405628042975471noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8783969302315257415.post-66313061637133191872011-06-08T19:08:10.072-05:002011-06-08T19:08:10.072-05:00A splendid essay on the history of the Royal Itali...A splendid essay on the history of the Royal Italian Army. It is interesting to me that, in general, the Italians made a better military showing in the First World War than the Second (the great exception, Caporetto, can largely be explained by the novelty of the German infiltration tactics and the fact that General Cadorna had ruined his front line troops in the Isonzo battles).<br /><br />The Italian problems in the Second War were due in no small part to Mussolini and his place-men's interference in the force structure -- Mussolini wanted larger numbers of divisions so he denuded the infantry divisions of an infantry regiment each (meaning they had no reserves) and supporting troops to match. He then exported too many of their better arms at the expense of his own force. <br /><br />Finally, the troops the Italians employed in Libya in 1940-42 (where the Royal Army got its somewhat undeserved bad reputation) had insufficient motor transport for that environment, and were often left in the lurch by the Germans.<br /><br />The Italians performed credibly enough in Yugoslavia in early 41 (although the earlier offensive into Greece from Albania was a monumental lash-up.<br /><br />Late war, the record is more mixed: by 1942 it was clear to most Italians that they had picked the wrong side. The units in Russia (the Alpini and Bersagliere generall excepted) weren't equipped to perform well. But the units in the Royal Army after Italy changed sides were useful enough, and so, it must be said, were some of the pro-Mussolini German puppet units.El Jefe Maximohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14661511063910659377noreply@blogger.com